Informed Traders: Linking Legal Insider Trading and Share Repurchases

Posted: 24 Jan 2012

See all articles by Konan Chan

Konan Chan

National Chengchi Unversity (NCCU) - Finance

David L. Ikenberry

Leeds School of Business, University of Colorado Boulder

Inmoo Lee

KAIST College of Business

Yanzhi Wang

Yuan Ze University - Department of Finance

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 23, 2012

Abstract

Logic suggests that a link might exist between insider trades and share repurchases because of their potential to signal mispricing when market prices deviate from fair value; both events emanate from essentially the same set of decision makers. Using the overall repurchase sample, adding insider-trading information is generally not helpful. For “value” buyback companies, however, where perceived mispricing may be a more important factor, insider trading provides a strong complement to the repurchase signal.

Keywords: Equity Investments, Equity Market Valuation and Return Analysis, Portfolio Management, Equity Portfolio Management Strategies

Suggested Citation

Chan, Konan and Ikenberry, David L. and Lee, Inmoo and Wang, Yanzhi, Informed Traders: Linking Legal Insider Trading and Share Repurchases (January 23, 2012). Financial Analysts Journal, Vol. 68, No. 1, 2012, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1990500

Konan Chan (Contact Author)

National Chengchi Unversity (NCCU) - Finance ( email )

No. 64, Chih-Nan Road
Section 2
Taipei, 11623
Taiwan
+886-2-29393091 ext 81239 (Phone)

David L. Ikenberry

Leeds School of Business, University of Colorado Boulder ( email )

Boulder, CO 80309-0419
United States
303-492-1809 (Phone)

Inmoo Lee

KAIST College of Business ( email )

85 Hoegiro Dongdaemun-Gu
Seoul 02455
Korea, Republic of (South Korea)

Yanzhi Wang

Yuan Ze University - Department of Finance ( email )

135, Far-East Rd., Chung-Li
Taoyuan, ROC
Taiwan

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