Testing an Informational Theory of Legislation: Evidence from the U.S. House of Representatives: Supplementary Appendix

13 Pages Posted: 9 Feb 2012 Last revised: 12 Oct 2012

See all articles by Attila Ambrus

Attila Ambrus

Duke University - Department of Economics

László Sándor

Luxembourg School of Finance, University of Luxembourg

Hye Young You

Vanderbilt University

Date Written: October 9, 2012

Abstract

Supplementary Appendix to Testing an Informational Theory of Legislation: Evidence from the U.S. House of Representatives.

Suggested Citation

Ambrus, Attila and Sándor, László and You, Hye Young, Testing an Informational Theory of Legislation: Evidence from the U.S. House of Representatives: Supplementary Appendix (October 9, 2012). Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) Working Paper No. 122. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1990502

Attila Ambrus (Contact Author)

Duke University - Department of Economics ( email )

100 Fuqua Drive
Durham, NC 27708-0204
United States

László Sándor

Luxembourg School of Finance, University of Luxembourg ( email )

4 Rue Albert Borschette
Luxembourg, L-1246
Luxembourg

Hye Young You

Vanderbilt University ( email )

Department of Political Science
Commons Center 353, 230 Appleton Place
Nashville, TN 37240
United States

HOME PAGE: http://hyeyoungyou.com

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