Billionaires

Posted: 25 Jan 2012

See all articles by Tino Sanandaji

Tino Sanandaji

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)

Peter T. Leeson

George Mason University - Department of Economics; George Mason University - Mercatus Center

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 23, 2012

Abstract

Existing studies of entrepreneurship focus on entrepreneurs whose individual contribution to wealth creation is typically trivial: self-employed persons. This paper investigates entrepreneurs whose individual contribution to wealth creation is enormous: billionaires. We explore the relationship between economic development, institutions, and these contrasting kinds of entrepreneurs. We find that the institutions consistent with self-employed entrepreneurs differ markedly from the ones consistent with billionaires. Further, only the latter are consistent with the institutions that underlie economic prosperity. Where well-protected private property rights and supporting, market-enhancing institutions flourish, so do billionaires. But self-employed entrepreneurs don't. Where private property rights are weakly protected and interventionist institutions flourish, so do self-employed entrepreneurs. But billionaires don't.

Suggested Citation

Sanandaji, Tino and Leeson, Peter T., Billionaires (January 23, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1990533

Tino Sanandaji

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) ( email )

Box 55665
Grevgatan 34, 2nd floor
Stockholm, SE-102 15
Sweden
0723230694 (Phone)

Peter T. Leeson (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )

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Fairfax, VA 22030
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.peterleeson.com

George Mason University - Mercatus Center ( email )

3434 Washington Blvd., 4th Floor
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

HOME PAGE: http://ppe.mercatus.org/scholars/peter-leeson

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