Judges' Law: Ideology and Coalition in Mexico's Electoral Tribunal

15 Pages Posted: 25 Jan 2012

See all articles by Federico Estévez

Federico Estévez

Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM)

Eric Magar

Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) - Political Science Department

Date Written: November 8, 2008

Abstract

We report work in progress. The paper investigates the voting records of members of Mexico's Federal Election Tribunal (TRIFE) between 1996 and 2006. We employ Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods to fit a Bayesian measurement model of ideal points for eight judges' who served in the period. Our results show that, even if judges seldom vote divided, systematic cleavages appear when they do. Judges have policy preferences spreading them along an ideological space roughly in three groups.

Keywords: roll call voting, judges, election regulation, Mexico

JEL Classification: D72, K39

Suggested Citation

Estévez, Federico and Magar, Eric, Judges' Law: Ideology and Coalition in Mexico's Electoral Tribunal (November 8, 2008). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1991076 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1991076

Federico Estévez

Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) ( email )

Av. Camino a Sta. Teresa 930
Col. Héroes de Padierna
Mexico City, D.F. 01000, Federal District 01080
Mexico

Eric Magar (Contact Author)

Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) - Political Science Department ( email )

Rio Hondo 1
Col. Tizapan San-Angel
Mexico City, D.F. 01000
Mexico
525556284079 (Phone)
525554904674 (Fax)

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