Veto Bargaining and Coalition Formation: A Theory of Presidential Policymaking with Application to Venezuela

41 Pages Posted: 25 Jan 2012

See all articles by Octavio Amorim Neto

Octavio Amorim Neto

Brazilian School of Public and Business Administration (EBAPE)

Eric Magar

Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) - Political Science Department

Date Written: March 8, 2000

Abstract

This paper reports a work in progress. We extend a simple, complete-information model of executive-legislative bargaining over policy devised for the U.S. to fit the case of Venezuela. We first deal with two major differences between the two systems: Venezuelan presidents have a weaker veto than their U.S. counterparts, and Venezuelan presidents can initiate bills. Two main predictions follow from the model’s assumptions: no veto should ever occur, and no executive-sponsored bill should ever be defeated; the logic behind both hypotheses is anticipation. The evidence from Venezuela (1959-1995) falsifies both predictions, suggesting that some of the model’s assumptions are too restrictive. We make tentative suggestions of what a more complete model should look like. We then address a third difference between the presidential systems of Venezuela and the U.S.: Venezuelan presidents often make post-election coalitions to improve their support in the assembly. We find strong evidence of one effect of this legislative strategy: coalition cabinets have better support for their programs in the legislature.

Keywords: executive-legislative relations, veto, Venezuela

JEL Classification: D72, D74

Suggested Citation

Amorim Neto, Octavio and Magar, Eric, Veto Bargaining and Coalition Formation: A Theory of Presidential Policymaking with Application to Venezuela (March 8, 2000). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1991086 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1991086

Octavio Amorim Neto

Brazilian School of Public and Business Administration (EBAPE) ( email )

Brazil

Eric Magar (Contact Author)

Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) - Political Science Department ( email )

Rio Hondo 1
Col. Tizapan San-Angel
Mexico City, D.F. 01000
Mexico
525556284079 (Phone)
525554904674 (Fax)

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