Coordinated Conduct: A Review of Preconditions for Profitability and Stability

23 Pages Posted: 24 Jan 2012 Last revised: 23 Jan 2013

Richard Stockton Higgins

BRG

Mark Perelman

PineBridge Investments

Date Written: January 22, 2013

Abstract

We have investigated the likelihood of cartel formation within various oligopoly models relying on various previous works which analyzed cartel profitability as well as cartel stability in the sense of d’Aspremont, Jacquemin, Gabszewicz and Weymark (1983). Specifically, a cartel is considered stable whenever no outsider desires to join and no insider desires to defect even though for a given cartel size, outsiders may earn more than insiders. Our review has addressed the basic structural preconditions for profitable cartel formation when some but not all firms in a market engage in coordinated pricing and production. We think that prior to consideration of the various factors that influence the profitability of establishing and enforcing an agreement, a structural screen is appropriate.

Keywords: Cartels, Collusion, Antitrust

Suggested Citation

Higgins, Richard Stockton and Perelman, Mark, Coordinated Conduct: A Review of Preconditions for Profitability and Stability (January 22, 2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1991151 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1991151

Richard Stockton Higgins (Contact Author)

BRG ( email )

1800 M Street NW
Second floor
Washington, DC 20036
United States
2024802743 (Phone)

Mark Perelman

PineBridge Investments ( email )

399 Park Avenue, 4th Floor
New York, NY 10022
United States

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