Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=1991460
 
 

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The Roommate Problem Is More Stable than You Think


Pierre-Andre Chiappori


Columbia University - Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Department of Economics

Alfred Galichon


NYU, Department of Economics and Courant Institute

Bernard Salanie


Columbia University - Graduate School of Arts and Sciences - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

August 4, 2012


Abstract:     
Stable matchings may fail to exist in the roommate matching problem, both when utility is transferable and when it is not. We show that when utility is transferable, the existence of a stable matching is restored when there is an even number of individuals of indistinguishable characteristics and tastes (types). As a consequence, when the number of individuals of any given type is large enough there always exist quasi-stable matchings: a stable matching can be restored with minimal policy intervention. Our results build on an analogy with an associated bipartite problem; it follows that the tools crafted in empirical studies of the marriage problem can easily be adapted to the roommate problem.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 28

Keywords: matching, roommate problem, stability

JEL Classification: C78


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Date posted: January 25, 2012 ; Last revised: August 6, 2012

Suggested Citation

Chiappori, Pierre-Andre and Galichon, Alfred and Salanie, Bernard, The Roommate Problem Is More Stable than You Think (August 4, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1991460 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1991460

Contact Information

Pierre-Andre Chiappori
Columbia University - Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Department of Economics ( email )
420 W. 118th Street
New York, NY 10027
United States
Alfred Galichon (Contact Author)
NYU, Department of Economics and Courant Institute ( email )
269 Mercer Street, 7th Floor
New York, NY 10011
United States
Bernard Salanie
Columbia University - Graduate School of Arts and Sciences - Department of Economics ( email )
420 W. 118th Street
New York, NY 10027
United States
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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