Alternative Time Patterns of Decisions and Dynamic Strategic Interactions

14 Pages Posted: 28 Jan 2012

See all articles by Pierre Cahuc

Pierre Cahuc

National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) - National School for Statistical and Economic Administration (ENSAE); Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne - Equipe Universitaire de Recherche en Economie Quantitative (EUREQUA); University of Angers - French National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Hubert Kempf

Ecole Normale Superieure de Cachan (ENS)

Date Written: November 1997

Abstract

This paper offers a simple approach to study steady‐state Markov perfect equilibria arising in dynamic games when players (are obliged to) commit their actions for several periods. It highlights the importance of spillovers and dynamic strategic interactions when assessing the various time patterns conceivable in such games. The obtained results are then applied to various, either micro‐or macroeconomic, issues where time patterns of decisions matter.

Suggested Citation

Cahuc, Pierre and Kempf, Hubert, Alternative Time Patterns of Decisions and Dynamic Strategic Interactions (November 1997). The Economic Journal, Vol. 107, Issue 445, pp. 1728-1741, 1997. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1994225 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.1997.tb00077.x

Pierre Cahuc

National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) - National School for Statistical and Economic Administration (ENSAE) ( email )

92245 Malakoff Cedex
France

Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne - Equipe Universitaire de Recherche en Economie Quantitative (EUREQUA) ( email )

106-112 Boulevard de l'Hopital
Paris Cedex 13, 75647
France
+33 1 4117 3717 (Phone)
+33 1 4117 3724 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://eurequa.univ-paris1.fr/membres/cahuc/

University of Angers - French National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS)

106-112 Boulevard de l'Hopital
75647 Paris Cedex 13
France
+33 4 44 07 82 06 (Phone)
+33 4 44 07 82 02 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Hubert Kempf

Ecole Normale Superieure de Cachan (ENS) ( email )

61 avenue du président Wilson
Cachan, Paris 94235
France

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