Who Lobbies the European Union? National Interest Groups in a Multilevel Polity

Abstract

What explains variation across national interest groups in their amount of lobbying on legislative proposals in the European Union (EU)? We present an argument that leads to the expectation that resource-rich associations engage in more lobbying on EU legislation than other associations. Moreover, we expect business associations to have privileged access to the European Commission and national governments; and citizens’ groups to parliaments. Using original data from a survey of 1417 interesgroups in Germany, Ireland and Spain, we find support for these expectations. We conclude that national associations are heavily involved in EU lobbying, but that resource-endowment and type matter for access. The paper is of relevance to the literatures on interest groups in the EU, the EU’s (alleged) democratic deficit, and the role of civil society in governance beyond the nation state.

Keywords: Interest groups, European Union, survey, non-state actors, multilevel governance, lobbying