Who Lobbies the European Union? National Interest Groups in a Multilevel Polity

Journal of European Public Policy, 2012

32 Pages Posted: 31 Jan 2012

See all articles by Andreas Dür

Andreas Dür

University of Salzburg - Department of Political Science and Sociology

Gemma Mateo González

University of Salzburg

Date Written: January 28, 2012

Abstract

What explains variation across national interest groups in their amount of lobbying on legislative proposals in the European Union (EU)? We present an argument that leads to the expectation that resource-rich associations engage in more lobbying on EU legislation than other associations. Moreover, we expect business associations to have privileged access to the European Commission and national governments; and citizens’ groups to parliaments. Using original data from a survey of 1417 interesgroups in Germany, Ireland and Spain, we find support for these expectations. We conclude that national associations are heavily involved in EU lobbying, but that resource-endowment and type matter for access. The paper is of relevance to the literatures on interest groups in the EU, the EU’s (alleged) democratic deficit, and the role of civil society in governance beyond the nation state.

Keywords: Interest groups, European Union, survey, non-state actors, multilevel governance, lobbying

Suggested Citation

Dür, Andreas and Mateo González, Gemma, Who Lobbies the European Union? National Interest Groups in a Multilevel Polity (January 28, 2012). Journal of European Public Policy, 2012, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1994448

Andreas Dür (Contact Author)

University of Salzburg - Department of Political Science and Sociology ( email )

Akademiestraße 26
Salzburg, Salzburg 5020
Austria

Gemma Mateo González

University of Salzburg ( email )

Akademiestraße 26
Salzburg, Salzburg 5020
Austria

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