Performance-Related Pay or Pay for Participation? Forms of Agreement and Determinants: Evidence from Companies in Emilia-Romagna

33 Pages Posted: 8 Feb 2000

See all articles by Giulio Cainelli

Giulio Cainelli

Università degli Studi di Bari - Dipartimento per lo Studio delle Societa Mediterranee; CERIS-CNR

Roberto Fabbri

University of Ferrara - Faculty of Economics

Paolo Pini

University of Ferrara - Department of Economics, Institutions and Territory; Faculty of Economics

Date Written: November 1999

Abstract

Since the July 1993 agreement in Italy, the adoption of company agreements based on a link between compensation and company performance has spread, becoming quite significant a presence even at the local level, without, however, involving companies overall where collective bargaining takes place. Consequently, studies of bonuses have recently been addressed to the examination of this phenomenon also for firms located in specific geographical areas, not just with reference to a sample of them, in general of medium-large size, at the national level. In this study, company bargaining on performance-related pay (PRP) and/or pay for participation (PFP) is examined in the years 1994-1997 in Emilia-Romagna. First of all, forms of agreement on PRP/PFP are analysed to find out the incentive, risk-sharing and participation mechanisms suggested by economic theory and embodied within each contract. Secondly, an econometric analysis is carried out on the factors behind the introduction of PRP/PFP, and of the various forms it takes in practice.

JEL Classification: J33, J59

Suggested Citation

Cainelli, Giulio and Fabbri, Roberto and Pini, Paolo, Performance-Related Pay or Pay for Participation? Forms of Agreement and Determinants: Evidence from Companies in Emilia-Romagna (November 1999). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=199494 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.199494

Giulio Cainelli

Università degli Studi di Bari - Dipartimento per lo Studio delle Societa Mediterranee ( email )

Piazza Umberto I
70124 Bari, 70121
Italy

CERIS-CNR ( email )

Via Avogadro 8
10121 Torino
Italy

Roberto Fabbri

University of Ferrara - Faculty of Economics ( email )

C.so Ercole I° d'Este 37
Ferrara, 44100
Italy

Paolo Pini (Contact Author)

University of Ferrara - Department of Economics, Institutions and Territory ( email )

Via Voltapaletto n.11
Ferrara, Ferrara 44100
Italy

Faculty of Economics ( email )

Via Voltapaletto n.11
Ferrara, Ferrara 44100
Italy

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