Corporate Governance in Post-Privatized Slovenia

34 Pages Posted: 21 Feb 2000  

Rado Bohinc

University of California School of Law

Stephen M. Bainbridge

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - School of Law

Date Written: December 1999

Abstract

The basic building blocks of post-privatization Slovenian corporate governance differ rather dramatically from those of the United States. Slovene corporations are characterized by highly concentrated ownership dominated by state-controlled funds and other institutional investors. In addition, Slovene corporation law provides for a two-tier board of directors (similar to the German codetermination system) in which employees are entitled to representation on both the management and supervisory boards. This article provides an analysis of these features, exploring possible reforms in Slovenian law that might enhance the effectiveness of Slovene boards of directors.

JEL Classification: G30, G38, K22, P31

Suggested Citation

Bohinc, Rado and Bainbridge, Stephen M., Corporate Governance in Post-Privatized Slovenia (December 1999). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=199548 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.199548

Rado Bohinc

University of California School of Law

385 Charles E. Young Dr. East
Room 1242
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1476
United States

Stephen Mark Bainbridge (Contact Author)

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - School of Law ( email )

385 Charles E. Young Dr. East
Room 1242
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1476
United States
310-206-1599 (Phone)
310-825-6023 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.professorbainbridge.com

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