The 'Services' Explanation for Resale Price Maintenance (RPM): Deleterious Results Missed in the Economics Literature and in Legal Decisions

Posted: 1 Feb 2012 Last revised: 12 Jul 2013

See all articles by Tarcisio da Graca

Tarcisio da Graca

Université du Québec en Outaouais

Robert T. Masson

Cornell University

Date Written: January 30, 2012

Abstract

Policy discussions and a Supreme Court decision interpret retailer services induced by retail price maintenance (RPM) as enhancing consumer surplus (CS) and welfare enhancing, marginalizing dissenting opinions which use similar models but with different parameters. However if presales services stimulate demand by providing information about a product's value they need not raise post sale value in use. Inframarginal consumers' presales perceived value may increase, but their post sale value may be unchanged so their supposed CS gains are ephemeral, their actual surplus falls proportional to price increase. We show, even adding in gains to marginal consumers, effects on CS are far more negative than conceived of in this literature. Consequently, in a rule of reason antitrust environment, if RPM is challenged without alleging collusion or exclusion, presales demand inducing information provision is a flimsy defence if CS is the standard, and not always convincing if total surplus is the standard.

Keywords: Resale Price Maintenance, Welfare Effects

JEL Classification: L42

Suggested Citation

da Graca, Tarcisio and Masson, Robert T., The 'Services' Explanation for Resale Price Maintenance (RPM): Deleterious Results Missed in the Economics Literature and in Legal Decisions (January 30, 2012). Southern Economic Journal, 79(2), 450-463, September 2012, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1995805

Tarcisio Da Graca

Université du Québec en Outaouais ( email )

Case postale 1250
succursale Hull
Gatineau, Québec J8X 3X7
Canada

Robert T. Masson (Contact Author)

Cornell University ( email )

Ithaca, NY 14853
United States

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