Weighted Constrained Egalitarianism in Tu-Games

CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 1999-107

Posted: 7 Mar 2000

See all articles by Maurice Koster

Maurice Koster

University of Amsterdam - Department of Quantitative Economics (KE)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: 1999

Abstract

The constrained egalitarian solution of Dutta and Ray (1989) for TU-games is extended to asymmetric cases, using the notion of weight systems as in Kalai and Samet (1987, 1988). This weighted constrained egalitarian solution is based on the weighted Lorenz-criterion as an inequality measure. It is shown that in general there is at most one such weighted egalitarian solution for TU-games. Existence is proved for the class of convex games. Furthermore, the core of a positive valued convex game is covered by weighted constrained egalitarian solutions.

JEL Classification: A13, C71, D31, D63

Suggested Citation

Koster, Maurice, Weighted Constrained Egalitarianism in Tu-Games (1999). CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 1999-107, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=199734

Maurice Koster (Contact Author)

University of Amsterdam - Department of Quantitative Economics (KE) ( email )

Roetersstraat 11
Amsterdam, North-Holland 1018 WB
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://www.uva.nl/profiel/k/o/m.a.l.koster/m.a.l.koster.html

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