Estimating Discrete-Choice Games of Incomplete Information: Simple Static Examples

Abstract

We investigate the computational aspect of estimating discrete-choice games under incomplete information. In these games, multiple equilibria can exist. Also, different values of structural parameters can result in different numbers of equilibria. Consequently, under maximum-likelihood estimation, the likelihood function is a discontinuous function of the structural parameters. We reformulate the maximum-likelihood estimation problem as a constrained optimization problem in the joint space of structural parameters and economic endogenous variables. Under this formulation, the objective function and structural equations are smooth functions. The constrained optimization approach does not require repeatedly solving the game or finding all the equilibria. We use a simple, static-game example to demonstrate this approach, conducting Monte Carlo experiments to evaluate the finite-sample performance of the maximum-likelihood estimator, two-step estimators, and the nested pseudo-likelihood estimator.

Keywords: structural estimation, discrete-choice games of incomplete information, constrained optimization, multiple equilibria

JEL Classification: C13, C61