Information Transparency in Public Procurement: How it Works in Russian Regions

33 Pages Posted: 7 Feb 2012

See all articles by Elena A. Podkolzina

Elena A. Podkolzina

National Research University Higher School of Economics

Svetlana Pivovarova

National Research University Higher School of Economics

Anna Balsevich

National Research University Higher School of Economics

Date Written: October 12, 2011

Abstract

Transparency is often prescribed as a cure for almost all the diseases of modern society, but it is not quite clear why and how it might solve certain problems. In the paper we explore how transparency of the public procurement system in Russian regions is correlated with competition, corruption, and control, key factors that influence outcomes of procurement procedures. Using publicly available information, we construct several indicators that measure availability and usability of different types of information presented on regional public procurement websites. Indices based on these indicators show significant differences in transparency levels between Russian regions. In the empirical part of the paper we show that the transparency of information is significantly and negatively correlated with the level of corruption in the region and increases the utilization of control mechanisms in Russian public procurement. We also show that more transparent systems are associated with higher levels of competition.

Keywords: public procurement, information transparency, corruption

JEL Classification: H57

Suggested Citation

Podkolzina, Elena A. and Pivovarova, Svetlana and Balsevich, Anna, Information Transparency in Public Procurement: How it Works in Russian Regions (October 12, 2011). Higher School of Economics Research Paper No. WP BRP 01/EC/2011, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998069 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1998069

Elena A. Podkolzina (Contact Author)

National Research University Higher School of Economics ( email )

Myasnitskaya street, 20
Moscow, Moscow 119017
Russia

Svetlana Pivovarova

National Research University Higher School of Economics ( email )

HOME PAGE: http://www.hse.ru/org/persons/5572126

Anna Balsevich

National Research University Higher School of Economics ( email )

Myasnitskaya street, 20
Moscow, Moscow 119017
Russia

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