Monetary Policy Reform in a World of Central Banks

Global Financial Markets Working Paper No. 26

29 Pages Posted: 3 Feb 2012 Last revised: 20 Aug 2012

See all articles by Gunther Schnabl

Gunther Schnabl

University of Leipzig - Institute for Economic Policy

Date Written: February 2, 2012

Abstract

The paper identifies based on the monetary over investment theories by Wicksell (1898), Mises (1912) and Hayek (1929) monetary policy mistakes in large industrial countries issuing international currencies. It its argued that a neglect towards monetary policy reform in a world dominated by financial markets has led to the erosion of the allocation and signaling function of the interest rate, which has triggered an excessive rise of the government debt and structural distortions in the world economy. The backlash of high government debt levels on monetary policy making is argued to have led to a hysteresis of the liquidity trap. In this context, monetary reform is discussed with respect to the exit from low interest rate and high debt policies, an adaption of monetary policy rules to financial market dominated economic development, and the displacement of the prevalent world monetary system. Enhanced competition between dollar and euro as international currencies moderated by East Asia is proposed to constitute a more stable international monetary system.

Keywords: Economic Instability, Credit Cycles, Monetary Policy, Hayek, Mises, Monetary Policy Rules, Monetary Policy Reform, Currency Competition

JEL Classification: E42, E58, F33, F44

Suggested Citation

Schnabl, Gunther, Monetary Policy Reform in a World of Central Banks (February 2, 2012). Global Financial Markets Working Paper No. 26. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998092 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1998092

Gunther Schnabl (Contact Author)

University of Leipzig - Institute for Economic Policy ( email )

Institute for Economic Policy
Grimmaische Stra├če 12
Leipzig, 04109
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.wifa.uni-leipzig.de/iwp/

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