Money in Judicial Politics: Individual Contributions and Collective Decisions

43 Pages Posted: 6 Feb 2012

See all articles by Matias Iaryczower

Matias Iaryczower

Princeton University

Matthew Shum

California Institute of Technology

Date Written: January 23, 2012

Abstract

We study how campaign contributions affect the voting strategies and effectiveness of justices in the Supreme Court of eight US states. A judge's voting strategy leans more heavily towards an interest group the larger are its contributions to the judge, and the smaller are its contributions to other members of the court. This indirect effect is consistent with an equilibrium adjustment to contributions to other members of the court. Observed contributions have a large effect on the behavior of individual judges -- affecting both the probability that they vote to overturn a decision of the lower court and the probability that they support an incorrect decision -- but they have a small effect on the decisions and effectiveness of the Court.

Suggested Citation

Iaryczower, Matias and Shum, Matthew, Money in Judicial Politics: Individual Contributions and Collective Decisions (January 23, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998895 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1998895

Matias Iaryczower (Contact Author)

Princeton University ( email )

Corwin Hall
Princeton, NJ 08544-1012
United States

Matthew Shum

California Institute of Technology ( email )

Pasadena, CA 91125
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
88
Abstract Views
905
rank
392,823
PlumX Metrics