56 Pages Posted: 6 Feb 2012 Last revised: 1 Feb 2017
Date Written: September 12, 2015
We study conference calls as a voluntary disclosure channel and create a proxy for the time horizon that senior executives emphasize in their communications. We find that our measure of disclosure time horizon is associated with capital market pressures and executives’ short-term monetary incentives. Consistent with the language emphasized during conference calls partially capturing short-termism, we show that our proxy is associated with earnings and real activities management. Overall, the results show that the time horizon of conference call narratives can be informative about managers’ myopic behavior.
Keywords: short termism, corporate performance, conference calls, investor base, risk, cost of capital
JEL Classification: G12, G14, G21, M41
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Brochet, Francois and Loumioti, Maria and Serafeim, George, Speaking of the Short-Term: Disclosure Horizon and Managerial Myopia (September 12, 2015). Review of Accounting Studies, Volume 20, Issue 3, pp 1122–1163.. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1999484 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1999484