Insurance Games

Tilburg University, CentER Working Paper No. 1999-95

Posted: 10 Mar 2000

See all articles by Jeroen Suijs

Jeroen Suijs

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Economics (ESE)

Abstract

This paper shows how (re)insurance problems can be modeled as cooperative games with stochastic payoffs. It determines Pareto optimal allocations of risk. Furthermore, it shows that a core-allocation is obtained if one uses the zero utility premium calculation principle to determine the insurance premium that an agent has to pay for his insurance.

JEL Classification: C71

Suggested Citation

Suijs, Jeroen, Insurance Games. Tilburg University, CentER Working Paper No. 1999-95, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=200114

Jeroen Suijs (Contact Author)

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) ( email )

P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam, NL 3062 PA
Netherlands

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