Bankers’ Pay after the 2008 Crisis: Regulatory Reforms in the US and the EU

Abstract

We examine the political dynamics which led to the codification of the Principles and Standards for sound compensation practices at financial institutions at international (G 20) level and to their subsequent implementation on both sides of the Atlantic. We show that the regulation of bankers’ pay is presently more detailed and less flexible in Europe than in the US, despite the fact that the 2008 crisis originated in the latter country and the levels of executive pay were no doubt higher in the US than in Europe. We also find that remuneration practices at large US banks are strongly converging towards the international Principles, well beyond what required under applicable regulations. As a result, both EU and US compensation practices at large banks generally converge, whilst the framework is more divergent when considering banks that are less complex and do not have significant international activities.

Keywords: Executive remuneration, corporate governance, banks, financial crisis, Dodd-Frank, Capital Requirements Directive, CRD III, prudential regulation, supervision

JEL Classification: G20, G21, G28, G30, G32, G34, G38, K22, K31, M12