Epistemological Skepticism(s) and Rational Self-Control

The Monist, Vol. 85, No. 3, pp. 468-477, 2002

11 Pages Posted: 13 Feb 2012

See all articles by Brian Ribeiro

Brian Ribeiro

University of Tennessee at Chattanooga - Department of Philosophy & Religion

Date Written: February 9, 2012

Abstract

In this paper I aim to do two things. First, I attempt to illustrate an interesting pattern of argument one can find in Hume's work. Next, I employ this Humean pattern of argument to show that IF there is a cogent and intuitive argument for any form of epistemological skepticism, which despite its cogency and intuitiveness has a (literally) unbelievable conclusion, THEN we lack a very important form of doxastic self-control, which I call rational self-control (RSC), over the beliefs problematized by that skeptical argument. Thus, (1) the challenge posed by skepticism is even deeper and more radical than commonly supposed: If any form of skepticism proves unanswerable and yet unbelievable, then we demonstrably lack RSC in the domain problematized by that form of skepticism. Thus, (2) one's views on skepticism may entail definite views on (at least one form of) doxastic self-control.

Keywords: David Hume, skepticism, doxastic control, epistemic agency

Suggested Citation

Ribeiro, Brian, Epistemological Skepticism(s) and Rational Self-Control (February 9, 2012). The Monist, Vol. 85, No. 3, pp. 468-477, 2002, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2002315

Brian Ribeiro (Contact Author)

University of Tennessee at Chattanooga - Department of Philosophy & Religion ( email )

Department of Philosophy & Religion (#2753)
615 McCallie Ave.
Chattanooga, TN 37403
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.brian-ribeiro.com

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