Must the Radical Skeptic Be Intellectually Akratic?
Facta Philosophica, Vol. 8, pp. 207-219, 2006
7 Pages Posted: 13 Feb 2012
Date Written: February 9, 2012
Supposing you were convinced by certain radical skeptical arguments that many of your beliefs were not justifiably believed by you, what stance could/should you adopt with regard to those skeptically-problematized beliefs? This paper explores a range of possible reactions, aiming to be reasonably comprehensive in coverage though admittedly suggestive rather than decisive in its treatment of each individual reaction. In considering this variety of responses we begin to see suggestive intimations of the ways in which radical skepticism could represent a threat to our notions of cognitive self-mastery.
Keywords: intellectual akrasia, epistemic akrasia, skepticism
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation