Campaign Spending in Proportional Electoral Systems: Incumbents Versus Challengers Revisited

Comparative Political Studies,Online, October 2012

Posted: 11 Feb 2012 Last revised: 24 Aug 2015

See all articles by Joel W. Johnson

Joel W. Johnson

Colorado State University, Pueblo

Date Written: October 1, 2011

Abstract

This paper (1) argues that campaign spending is no more effective for challengers than incumbents in congressional elections using candidate-centered forms of proportional representation (PR); (2) develops a new method to estimate spending effects in poly-candidate elections; and (3) demonstrates that spending benefits incumbents as much as challengers in the congressional elections of three separate countries (Brazil, Ireland, and Finland). The paper also offers a theory of campaign spending effectiveness that emphasizes a candidate’s relative potential to attract new electoral support as determined by both pre-campaign familiarity and personal, partisan, and ideological attributes. Challengers and incumbents obtain similar returns to spending under PR because its permissiveness encourages challengers who are limited in their abilities to build electoral support, even when they spend heavily. The theory and findings have important implications for understanding the effects of campaign finance and campaign finance regulations.

Comparative Political Studies (Published online October 2012).

Keywords: campaign spending, electoral systems, proportional representation, Brazilian elections, Irish elections, Finnish elections

Suggested Citation

Johnson, Joel W., Campaign Spending in Proportional Electoral Systems: Incumbents Versus Challengers Revisited (October 1, 2011). Comparative Political Studies,Online, October 2012 , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2002850

Joel W. Johnson (Contact Author)

Colorado State University, Pueblo ( email )

2200 Bonforte Blvd
Pueblo, CO 81001
United States

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