Quadratic Voting: How Mechanism Design Can Radicalize Democracy
American Economic Association Papers and Proceedings, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2018
5 Pages Posted: 13 Feb 2012 Last revised: 26 Dec 2017
Date Written: December 24, 2017
Can mechanism design save democracy? We propose a simple design that offers a chance: individuals pay for as many votes as they wish using a number of "voice credits" quadratic in the votes they buy. Only quadratic cost induces marginal costs linear in votes purchased and thus welfare optimality if individuals' valuation of votes is proportional to their value of changing the outcome. A variety of analysis and evidence suggests that this still-nascent mechanism has significant promise to robustly correct the failure of existing democracies to incorporate intensity of preference and knowledge.
The online appendix for "Quadratic Voting: How Mechanism Design Can Radicalize Democracy" may be found here: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2790624.
Keywords: social choice, collective decisions, large markets, costly voting, vote trading
JEL Classification: D47, D61, D71, C72, D82, H41, P16
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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