Voluntary Environmental Agreements in Developing Countries: The Colombian Experience

Resources for the Future Discussion Paper No. 12-06

51 Pages Posted: 14 Feb 2012 Last revised: 3 Apr 2012

See all articles by Allen Blackman

Allen Blackman

Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)

Eduardo Uribe

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Bart Hoof

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Thomas P. Lyon

University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business

Date Written: February 8, 2012

Abstract

According to proponents, voluntary agreements (VAs) negotiated with polluters sidestep weak institutions and other barriers to conventional environmental regulation in developing countries. Yet little is known about their effectiveness. We examine VAs in Colombia, a global leader in the use of these policies. We find that the main motive for using VAs has been to build capacity needed for broader environmental regulatory reform. Their additional effect on environmental performance has been questionable. These findings suggest that in developing countries, VAs may be best suited to capacity building, not environmental management per se.

Keywords: voluntary environmental agreement, pollution, Colombia

JEL Classification: Q01, Q56, Q58

Suggested Citation

Blackman, Allen and Uribe, Eduardo and Hoof, Bart and Lyon, Thomas P., Voluntary Environmental Agreements in Developing Countries: The Colombian Experience (February 8, 2012). Resources for the Future Discussion Paper No. 12-06. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2004403 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2004403

Allen Blackman (Contact Author)

Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) ( email )

1300 New York Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20577
United States

Eduardo Uribe

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

Bart Hoof

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

Thomas P. Lyon

University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business ( email )

701 Tappan Street
Ann Arbor, MI MI 48109
United States
734-615-1639 (Phone)

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