Due Process as Separation of Powers

116 Pages Posted: 19 Feb 2012

See all articles by Nathan S. Chapman

Nathan S. Chapman

University of Georgia School of Law

Michael W. McConnell

Stanford Law School

Date Written: February 14, 2012


From its conceptual origin in Magna Charta, due process of law has required that government can only deprive persons of rights pursuant to a coordinated effort of separate institutions that make, execute, and adjudicate claims under the law. Originalist debates about whether the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments were understood to entail modern "substantive due process" have obscured the way that many American lawyers and courts understood due process to limit the legislature from the revolutionary era through the Civil War. They understood due process to prohibit legislatures from directly depriving persons of rights, especially vested property rights, because it was the court's role to do so pursuant to established and general law. This principle was applied against insufficiently general and prospective legislative acts under a variety of state and federal constitutional provisions through the antebellum era. Contrary to the claims of some scholars, however, there was virtually no precedent before the Fourteenth Amendment for invalidating laws that restricted liberty or the use of property. Contemporary resorts to originalism to support modern due process doctrines are therefore misplaced. Understanding due process as a particular instantiation of separation of powers does, however, shed new light on a number of key 20th century cases which have not been fully analyzed under the requirements of due process of law.

Keywords: constitution, due process, due process of law, separation of powers, legislative power, constitutional history, originalism

Suggested Citation

Chapman, Nathan S. and McConnell, Michael W., Due Process as Separation of Powers (February 14, 2012). Yale Law Journal, Forthcoming, Stanford Public Law Working Paper No. 2005406, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2005406

Nathan S. Chapman (Contact Author)

University of Georgia School of Law ( email )

225 Herty Drive
Athens, GA 30602
United States
(706) 542-5235 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.uga.edu/profile/nathan-s-chapman

Michael W. McConnell

Stanford Law School ( email )

559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
United States
650-723-4039 (Phone)
650-723-4669 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.stanford.edu

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
PlumX Metrics