Regulatory Conflict? Environmental and Economic Regulation of Electricity Generation

24 Pages Posted: 20 Mar 2000

See all articles by Melinda Acutt

Melinda Acutt

University of Liverpool

Caroline Elliott

Lancaster University - Management School

Date Written: May 1999

Abstract

Implementation of policies aimed at reducing atmospheric emissions has drawn attention to the need to integrate policies aimed at protection of the environment into other policy areas such as energy. In this paper we are concerned with the interaction of environmental policies aimed at reducing pollution, and economic policies aimed at reducing market power, in the electricity generation industry. While our analysis focuses on the post privatisation experiences in England and Wales, the analysis is intended to be of a wider applicability. In a theoretical model we find that there are welfare gains to be made from a move from the current non-cooperative regulatory regime to co-operative regulation between the environmental and economic regulators - a result that holds for the alternative environmental policies of a technology standard and an emissions tax.

Keywords: Environmental regulation, Economic regulation, Electricity generation

JEL Classification: H2, L5, Q4

Suggested Citation

Acutt, Melinda and Elliott, Caroline, Regulatory Conflict? Environmental and Economic Regulation of Electricity Generation (May 1999). FEEM Working Paper No. 40.99. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=200572 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.200572

Melinda Acutt (Contact Author)

University of Liverpool

Eleanor Rathbone Building
Bedford Street North Department of Economics & Accounting
Liverpool L69 7ZA
United Kingdom
+44 (0)151 794-3040 (Phone)
+44 (0)151 794-3028 (Fax)

Caroline Elliott

Lancaster University - Management School ( email )

Bailrigg
Lancaster, LA1 4YX
United Kingdom
+44 (0)1524 594225 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.lums.lancs.ac.uk/profiles/123/

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