Voluntary Approaches, Market Structure and Competition

53 Pages Posted: 18 Jan 2000

See all articles by Rinaldo Brau

Rinaldo Brau

Università di Cagliari - Department of Economics & Business; Universita di Cagliari - Centre for North South Economic Research (CRENOS)

Carlo Carraro

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM); Ca' Foscari University of Venice; CMCC - Euro Mediterranean Centre for Climate Change (Climate Policy Division); IPCC; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels; Green Growth Knowledge Platform; International Center for Climate Governance

Date Written: July 1999

Abstract

This paper surveys the recent literature devoted to the analysis of the interactions between the adoption of voluntary or negotiated agreements as a tool of environmental policy and market structure. The goal of this survey is twofold. On the one hand, we would like to identify the market environment which is most favourable to the adoption of voluntary approaches, namely whether these are more likely to be signed within industries that are more or less concentrated. On the other hand, we aim at assessing the effects of voluntary approaches on market structure and industry concentration. Our findings suggest that the signature of voluntary approaches is favoured by a situation in which industry is more concentrated.

Moreover, the adoption of voluntary approaches is likely to further increase industry concentration. This clearly raises a trade-off between environmental benefits and economic costs provided by the adoption of voluntary approaches that must be dealt with an appropriate policy-mix.

JEL Classification: L1, L59, Q00, Q28

Suggested Citation

Brau, Rinaldo and Carraro, Carlo, Voluntary Approaches, Market Structure and Competition (July 1999). FEEM Working Paper No. 53-99. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=200614 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.200614

Rinaldo Brau (Contact Author)

Università di Cagliari - Department of Economics & Business ( email )

V. S. Ignazio 17
Cagliari 09123, CA 09123
Italy
+39 070 6753315 (Phone)
+39 178 2243016 (Fax)

Universita di Cagliari - Centre for North South Economic Research (CRENOS) ( email )

V. S. Ignazio 78
Cagliari, 09124
ITALY

Carlo Carraro

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) ( email )

Isola di San Giorgio Maggiore 8
Venezia, 30124
Italy
+39 04 12700460 (Phone)
+39 04 12700412 (Fax)

Ca' Foscari University of Venice ( email )

Cannaregio 873
Venice, 30121
Italy
+39 04 1234 9166 (Phone)
+39 04 1234 9176 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.carlocarraro.org/

CMCC - Euro Mediterranean Centre for Climate Change (Climate Policy Division) ( email )

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Lecce, 73100
Italy
+39 0832 288650 (Phone)
+39 0832 277603 (Fax)

IPCC ( email )

C/O World Meteorological Organization
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+41-22-730-8025/13 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

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Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels

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Belgium
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+32 2 219 4151 (Fax)

Green Growth Knowledge Platform ( email )

International Environment House
11-13 chemin des Anemones
Geneva, 1219
Switzerland

HOME PAGE: http://www.greengrowthknowledge.org/

International Center for Climate Governance ( email )

Island of San Giorgio Maggiore 8
Venice, I-30124
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://www.iccgov.org/

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