Ownership and Voting Power in France

FEEM Working Paper No. 62-99

27 Pages Posted: 3 Jan 2000

See all articles by Laurence Bloch

Laurence Bloch

National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE)

Elisabeth Kremp

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Banque de France - Direction des Entreprises

Date Written: September 1999

Abstract

This paper provides an overview on ownership structure and voting power in France, both in terms of institutional and legal framework and of quantitative analysis. If cross share holdings in large groups were a characteristic of the French model, called 'financial core', and had been extended in 1986, with the first wave of privatisations, the foundations of this model seem to be weakened. This organisation has not been able to really prevent the increasing of foreign presence in French capitalisation. Looking at listed firms and CAC40 firms, and at a large data set of unlisted firms, this paper shows that concentration of direct ownership and voting power is very high in France, even for listed and CAC40 firms. The second direct owner lags far behind the first one and the category 'families' plays a major role in the detention of non-listed firms. The average ownership stakes of banks, insurance companies and other financial institutions are relatively low, except for CAC40 firms.

JEL Classification: G32, G34

Suggested Citation

Bloch, Laurence and Kremp, Elisabeth M., Ownership and Voting Power in France (September 1999). FEEM Working Paper No. 62-99, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=200632 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.200632

Laurence Bloch

National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) ( email )

18, Boulevard Adolphe-Pinard
75675 Paris Cedex 14
France

Elisabeth M. Kremp (Contact Author)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Banque de France - Direction des Entreprises

39 rue Croix des Petits Champs
Paris Cedex 01 75049
France

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
580
Abstract Views
3,727
rank
57,170
PlumX Metrics