Banking Regulations after the Global Financial Crisis, Good Intentions and Unintended Evil

39 Pages Posted: 18 Feb 2012 Last revised: 28 Oct 2014

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: February 17, 2012

Abstract

As a result of the global financial crisis, more stringent regulations on bank capital, liquidity and corporate structure have been passed. In this essay, we analyze the impact of these regulations and call attention to the fact that the dynamic responses by financial institutions might create unintended evil: a reduced supply of bank loans, incentives to securitize assets and move financial intermediation to shadow banking, and adverse incentives on bank risk monitoring. The conclusion is that privately-based mechanisms that put most creditors at risk - interbank lenders included - are the best way to restore the stability of financial markets.

Keywords: banking, bank regulation, Basel regulation

JEL Classification: G21,G28

Suggested Citation

Dermine, Jean, Banking Regulations after the Global Financial Crisis, Good Intentions and Unintended Evil (February 17, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2007114 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2007114

Jean Dermine (Contact Author)

INSEAD - Finance ( email )

Boulevard de Constance
F-77305 Fontainebleau Cedex
France
+33 1 60 72 41 33 (Phone)

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