Spectators Versus Stakeholders With/Without Information: The Difference it Makes for Justice

44 Pages Posted: 18 Feb 2012

See all articles by Leonardo Becchetti

Leonardo Becchetti

University of Rome Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics

Giacomo Degli Antoni

University of Parma

Stefania Ottone

Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Center for Interdisciplinary Studies in Economics, Psychology & Social Sciences (CISEPS); Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Department of Economics, Management and Statistics (DEMS)

Nazaria Solferino

University of Rome Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics

Date Written: February, 17 2012

Abstract

We document that being spectators (no effect on personal payoffs) and, to a lesser extent, stakeholders without information on relative payoffs, induces subjects who can choose distribution criteria after task performance to prefer rewarding talent (vis à vis effort, chance or strict egalitarianism) after guaranteeing a minimal egalitarian base. Information about distribution of payoffs under different criteria reduces dramatically such choice since most players opt or revise their decision in favor of the criterion which maximizes their own payoff (and, by doing so, end up being farther from the maximin choice). Large part (but not all) of the stakeholders’ choices before knowing the payoff distribution are driven by their performance beliefs since two thirds of them choose the criterion in which they assume to perform and earn relatively better.

Keywords: Distributive Justice, Perceived Fairness, Meritocracy, Talent, Chance, Effort

JEL Classification: C91, D63

Suggested Citation

Becchetti, Leonardo and Degli Antoni, Giacomo and Ottone, Stefania and Solferino, Nazaria, Spectators Versus Stakeholders With/Without Information: The Difference it Makes for Justice (February, 17 2012). CEIS Working Paper No. 221, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2007180 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2007180

Leonardo Becchetti (Contact Author)

University of Rome Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics ( email )

Via Columbia, 2
I-00133 Rome
Italy

Giacomo Degli Antoni

University of Parma ( email )

Via Dell'Università, 12
Parma, 43121
Italy

Stefania Ottone

Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Center for Interdisciplinary Studies in Economics, Psychology & Social Sciences (CISEPS) ( email )

Piazza dell'Ateneo Nuovo, 1
Milano, 20126
Italy

Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Department of Economics, Management and Statistics (DEMS) ( email )

Piazza dell'Ateneo Nuovo, 1
Milan, 20126
Italy

Nazaria Solferino

University of Rome Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics ( email )

Via Columbia n.2
Rome, rome 00100
Italy

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