Punishing Possession - China's All-Embracing Insider Trading Enforcement Regime

Insider Trading Research Handbook, Stephen Bainbridge, ed., 2012

U of Michigan Public Law Research Paper No. 342

20 Pages Posted: 18 Feb 2012 Last revised: 15 Nov 2013

Date Written: February 17, 2012

Abstract

可以發現,中國版本的這篇文章:ssrn.com/abstract=2305720

This paper presents a general introduction to the law of insider trading in the People's Republic of China, and the reality of enforcement against insider trading in China's domestic capital markets. The paper focuses on the extremely broad scope of insider trading liability created under internal administrative guidance formulated by the Chinese securities regulator, which departs significantly from the more narrowly-drawn insider trading prohibition established in China's 2006 Securities Law. Although the statute establishes a relatively narrow combination of the classical/fiduciary duty plus misappropriation theories for liability, the agency guidance -- formally and in application -- assures liability for trading when merely in possession of inside information. The paper concludes with a meditation on what this problem might mean for China's growing capital markets and regulation of them, in isolation and as those markets become ever more integrated with global markets.

Keywords: insider trading, securities regulation, China, PRC, corporate law, fiduciary duty, misappropriation

JEL Classification: K14, K33, M14, N20, N25, P34

Suggested Citation

Howson, Nicholas Calcina, Punishing Possession - China's All-Embracing Insider Trading Enforcement Regime (February 17, 2012). Insider Trading Research Handbook, Stephen Bainbridge, ed., 2012; U of Michigan Public Law Research Paper No. 342. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2007287

Nicholas Calcina Howson (Contact Author)

University of Michigan Law School ( email )

701 South State Street
3234 South Hall
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-3091
United States

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