Markov Perfect Equilibria in a N-Player War of Attrition
6 Pages Posted: 24 Feb 2012 Last revised: 25 Feb 2012
Date Written: February 1, 1995
Abstract
A symmetric finite-player war of attrition is studied in discrete time using the notion of Markov perfect equilibria. Considering the limit of the discrete time model as the decision interval becomes arbitrarily small allows a simple characterization of the mixed strategy equilibrium.
This is a preprint of the an article whose final version was published in Economics Letters.
Keywords: War of attrition, waiting games
JEL Classification: C70
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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