Markov Perfect Equilibria in a N-Player War of Attrition

6 Pages Posted: 24 Feb 2012 Last revised: 25 Feb 2012

See all articles by Sandeep Kapur

Sandeep Kapur

University of London - Economics, Mathematics and Statistics; University of London - Birkbeck College

Date Written: February 1, 1995

Abstract

A symmetric finite-player war of attrition is studied in discrete time using the notion of Markov perfect equilibria. Considering the limit of the discrete time model as the decision interval becomes arbitrarily small allows a simple characterization of the mixed strategy equilibrium.

This is a preprint of the an article whose final version was published in Economics Letters.

Keywords: War of attrition, waiting games

JEL Classification: C70

Suggested Citation

Kapur, Sandeep and Kapur, Sandeep, Markov Perfect Equilibria in a N-Player War of Attrition (February 1, 1995). Economics Letters, Vol. 47, No. 2, pp. 149-154, 1995, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2010028

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