Multi-Unit Auctions: A Comparison of Static and Dynamic Mechanisms

20 Pages Posted: 20 Feb 2000

See all articles by Alejandro Manelli

Alejandro Manelli

Arizona State University (ASU) - Economics Department

Martin Sefton

University of Nottingham - School of Economics

Benjamin S. Wilner

PAA Inc. Property Assessment Advisors

Date Written: December 1999

Abstract

We compare, experimentally, the Vickrey auction and an ascending-price auction recently introduced by Ausubel (1997). We evaluate the relative performance of both auctions in terms of efficiency and revenue in multi-unit environments where valuations either have a common-value component or are private information. We find that the Ausubel auction is less prone to overbidding and may yield higher revenue than the Vickrey auction. The gain in revenue seems to be coupled with a loss of efficiency.

JEL Classification: C90, D44

Suggested Citation

Manelli, Alejandro and Sefton, Martin and Wilner, Benjamin S., Multi-Unit Auctions: A Comparison of Static and Dynamic Mechanisms (December 1999). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=201031 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.201031

Alejandro Manelli (Contact Author)

Arizona State University (ASU) - Economics Department ( email )

PO Box 873806
Tempe, AZ 85287-3806
United States
(480) 965-3531 (Phone)
(480) 965-0748 (Fax)

Martin Sefton

University of Nottingham - School of Economics ( email )

University Park
Nottingham, NG7 2RD
United Kingdom

Benjamin S. Wilner

PAA Inc. Property Assessment Advisors ( email )

United States

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