19 Pages Posted: 25 Feb 2012 Last revised: 30 Jan 2013
Date Written: April 12, 2012
We discuss the impact of corruption as a contributing factor to "land grabs" in SSA and examine land grab deals by country pairs to identify which deals may be grabs and which may be normal FDI. Most deals are made by corrupt selling countries but buying countries vary in their corruption, indicating that some of these deals may be misclassified FDI. We also examine the potential for over-exploitation of water resources in these countries. Sudan, with high corruption and strained water resources, is likely to suffer the most from land grabs. A comparison between 17 SSA countries with heavy "grab" activity and 27 others with lower levels of activity reveals that "grab targets" have the same or better governance and water resources, a finding that contradicts a hypothesis that these deals are harmful grabs but supports one that they are beneficial FDI. Deals called "grabs" may not be.
[This is the WORKING paper version of the chapter that was eventually published by Taylor and Routledge. Email David if you have any questions about corrections to this text or page numbers for citation.]
Notes: The PDF for this working paper has been removed at the request of Routledge (Taylor & Francis) as the paper later appeared as a chapter in their book on Land Grabs in Africa.
Keywords: land grab, corruption, sustainability, food security, biofuels, FDI
JEL Classification: O13, Q15, Q17
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Zetland, David and Möller-Gulland, Jennifer, The Political Economy of Land and Water Grabs (April 12, 2012). PERC Research Paper No. 12-21. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2010552 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2010552