Key Player Policies When Contextual Effects Matter

22 Pages Posted: 1 Mar 2012  

Coralio Ballester

Universidad de Alicante

Yves Zenou

Stockholm University; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI); IZA Institute of Labor Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: January 2012

Abstract

We consider a model where the criminal decision of each individual is affected by not only her own characteristics, but also by the characteristics of her friends (contextual effects). We determine who the key player is, i.e. the criminal who once removed generates the highest reduction in total crime in the network. We generalize the intercentrality measure proposed by Ballester et al. (2006) by taking into account the change in contextual effects following the removal of the key player. We also provide an example that shows how the new formula can be calculated in practice.

Keywords: contextual effects., Crime, key players, peer effects

JEL Classification: A14, D85, K42, Z13

Suggested Citation

Ballester, Coralio and Zenou, Yves, Key Player Policies When Contextual Effects Matter (January 2012). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8806. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2013797

Coralio Ballester (Contact Author)

Universidad de Alicante ( email )

Campus de San Vicente
Carretera San Vicente del Raspeig
San Vicente del Raspeig, Alicante 03690
Spain

Yves Zenou

Stockholm University ( email )

Universitetsvägen 10
Stockholm, Stockholm SE-106 91
Sweden

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI) ( email )

P.O. Box 5501
S-114 85 Stockholm
Sweden

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom

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