Incentives and Stability of International Climate Coalitions: An Integrated Assessment

35 Pages Posted: 1 Mar 2012

See all articles by Valentina Bosetti

Valentina Bosetti

Bocconi University; CMCC - Euro Mediterranean Centre for Climate Change

Carlo Carraro

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM); Ca' Foscari University of Venice; CMCC - Euro Mediterranean Centre for Climate Change (Climate Policy Division); IPCC; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels; Green Growth Knowledge Platform; International Center for Climate Governance

Enrica De Cian

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM); CMCC - Centro Euro-Mediterraneo sui Cambiamenti Climatici

Emanuele Massetti

Georgia Institute of Technology; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); CMCC - Euro Mediterranean Centre for Climate Change

Massimo Tavoni

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM); Princeton University - Princeton Environmental Institute

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: February 2012

Abstract

This paper analyses the incentives to participate in and the stability of international climate coalitions. Using the integrated assessment model WITCH, the analysis of coalitionsÂ’ profitability and stability is performed under alternative assumptions concerning the pure rate of time preference, the social welfare aggregator and the extent of climate damages. We focus on the profitability, stability, and 'potential stability' of a number of coalitions which are 'potentially effective' in reducing emissions. We find that only the grand coalition under a specific sets of assumptions finds it optimal to stabilise GHG concentration below 550 ppm CO2-eq. However, the grand coalition is found not to be stable, not even 'potentially stable' even through an adequate set of transfers. However, there exist potentially stable coalitions, but of smaller size, which are also potentially environmentally effective. Depending on the assumptions made, they could achieve up to 600 ppm CO2-eq. More ambitious targets lead to the collapse of the coalition.

Keywords: Climate coalitions, Climate policy, Free riding, Game theory

JEL Classification: C68, C72, D58, Q54

Suggested Citation

Bosetti, Valentina and Carraro, Carlo and De Cian, Enrica and Massetti, Emanuele and Tavoni, Massimo, Incentives and Stability of International Climate Coalitions: An Integrated Assessment (February 2012). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8821. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2013812

Valentina Bosetti (Contact Author)

Bocconi University

Via Gobbi 5
Milan, 20136
Italy

CMCC - Euro Mediterranean Centre for Climate Change

via Augusto Imperatore, 16
Lecce, I-73100
Italy

Carlo Carraro

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) ( email )

Isola di San Giorgio Maggiore 8
Venezia, 30124
Italy
+39 04 12700460 (Phone)
+39 04 12700412 (Fax)

Ca' Foscari University of Venice ( email )

Cannaregio 873
Venice, 30121
Italy
+39 04 1234 9166 (Phone)
+39 04 1234 9176 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.carlocarraro.org/

CMCC - Euro Mediterranean Centre for Climate Change (Climate Policy Division) ( email )

Via Augusto Imperatore 16
Lecce, 73100
Italy
+39 0832 288650 (Phone)
+39 0832 277603 (Fax)

IPCC ( email )

C/O World Meteorological Organization
7bis Avenue de la Paix
Geneva, CH-1211
Switzerland
+41-22-730-8208/54/84 (Phone)
+41-22-730-8025/13 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels

1 Place du Congres
B-1000 Brussels, 1000
Belgium
+32 2 229 3911 (Phone)
+32 2 219 4151 (Fax)

Green Growth Knowledge Platform ( email )

International Environment House
11-13 chemin des Anemones
Geneva, 1219
Switzerland

HOME PAGE: http://www.greengrowthknowledge.org/

International Center for Climate Governance ( email )

Island of San Giorgio Maggiore 8
Venice, I-30124
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://www.iccgov.org/

Enrica De Cian

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) ( email )

Campo S. M. Formosa, Castello 5252
Venice, 30122
Italy

CMCC - Centro Euro-Mediterraneo sui Cambiamenti Climatici ( email )

via Augusto Imperatore, 16
Lecce, I-73100
Italy

Emanuele Massetti

Georgia Institute of Technology ( email )

685 Cherry St.
Atlanta, GA 30332-0345
United States

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

CMCC - Euro Mediterranean Centre for Climate Change

via Augusto Imperatore, 16
Lecce, I-73100
Italy

Massimo Tavoni

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) ( email )

Corso Magenta 63
20123 Milan
Italy

Princeton University - Princeton Environmental Institute

22 Chambers Street
Princeton, NJ 08544-0708
United States

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
0
Abstract Views
444
PlumX Metrics