Giving Away the Game? The Impact of the Disclosure Effect on the Patenting Decision

38 Pages Posted: 5 Mar 2012  

Diana Heger

IHS Economics

Alexandra K. Zaby

University of Tuebingen

Date Written: 2012

Abstract

This article explores the propensity to patent in the light of the disclosure effect. Unlike earlier approaches concerned with the patenting decision, we take into account that a disclosure effect may decrease the merits of patenting by facilitating inventing around the patent for competitors. In our theoretical model, we find that the disclosure effect - contingent on the competitive environment of the inventor - possibly has substantial negative effects on the propensity to patent. An empirical investigation of the theoretical results finds support for the proposed effects.

Keywords: patenting decision, secrecy, disclosure requirement, patent breadth, horizontal product differentiation, circular city

JEL Classification: L13, L24, O34

Suggested Citation

Heger, Diana and Zaby, Alexandra K., Giving Away the Game? The Impact of the Disclosure Effect on the Patenting Decision (2012). ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 12-010. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2014677 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2014677

Diana Heger (Contact Author)

IHS Economics ( email )

Bleichstr. 1
Frankfurt/Main
Germany

Alexandra Karin Zaby

University of Tuebingen ( email )

Mohlstrasse 36
Tuebingen, Baden Wuerttemberg 72074
Germany

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