Congressional Silence and the Statutory Interpretation Game

87 Pages Posted: 4 Mar 2012 Last revised: 3 May 2013

See all articles by Paul J. Stancil

Paul J. Stancil

Brigham Young University, J. Reuben Clark Law School

Date Written: March 2, 2012

Abstract

This Article explores the circumstances under which the federal legislative apparatus may be unable to respond to a politically objectionable statutory interpretation from the Supreme Court. The Article builds upon existing economic models of statutory interpretation, for the first time incorporating transaction costs into the analysis. The Article concludes by identifying recent real-world disputes in which transaction costs constrained Congress and the President from overriding the Court.

Keywords: statutory interpretation, law and economics, transaction costs, model, spatial model, congressional silence, game theory, pivotal politics, positive political theory, congressional override, legislative override

JEL Classification: H1, H11

Suggested Citation

Stancil, Paul J., Congressional Silence and the Statutory Interpretation Game (March 2, 2012). 54 William & Mary Law Review 1251 (2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2014793 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2014793

Paul J. Stancil (Contact Author)

Brigham Young University, J. Reuben Clark Law School ( email )

430 JRCB
Brigham Young University
Provo, UT 84602
United States

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