Winner-Take-All and Proportional-Prize Contests: Theory and Experimental Results

48 Pages Posted: 4 Mar 2012 Last revised: 29 Jan 2018

See all articles by Timothy N. Cason

Timothy N. Cason

Purdue University - Krannert School of Management

William A. Masters

Tufts University - Friedman School of Nutrition Science and Policy; Tufts University - Department of Economics

Roman M. Sheremeta

Case Western Reserve University

Date Written: January 29, 2018

Abstract

This study provides a unified framework to compare three canonical types of contests: winner-take-all contests won by the best performer, winner-take-all lotteries where probability of success is proportional to performance, and proportional-prize contests in which rewards are shared in proportion to performance. We derive equilibria and observe outcomes from each contest in a laboratory experiment. Equilibrium and observed efforts are highest in winner-take-all contests. Lotteries and proportional-prize contests have the same Nash equilibrium, but empirically, lotteries induce higher efforts and lower, more unequal payoffs. Behavioral deviations from theoretical benchmarks in different contests are caused by the same underlying attributes, such as risk-aversion and the utility of winning. Finally, we find that subjects exhibit consistent behavior across different types of contests, with subjects exerting higher effort in one contest also exerting higher effort in another contest.

Keywords: contests, rent-seeking, lotteries, incentives in experiments, risk aversion

JEL Classification: C72, D72, D74, J33

Suggested Citation

Cason, Timothy N. and Masters, William A. and Sheremeta, Roman M., Winner-Take-All and Proportional-Prize Contests: Theory and Experimental Results (January 29, 2018). Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2014994 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2014994

Timothy N. Cason

Purdue University - Krannert School of Management ( email )

1310 Krannert Building
West Lafayette, IN 47907-1310
United States
765-494-1737 (Phone)

William A. Masters

Tufts University - Friedman School of Nutrition Science and Policy ( email )

150 Harrison Avenue
Boston, MA 02111
United States

HOME PAGE: http://sites.tufts.edu/willmasters

Tufts University - Department of Economics ( email )

Medford, MA 02155
United States

Roman M. Sheremeta (Contact Author)

Case Western Reserve University ( email )

10900 Euclid Ave.
Cleveland, OH 44106
United States

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
579
rank
42,803
Abstract Views
2,186
PlumX