Inside the Black Box of Ability Peer Effects: Evidence from Variation in the Proportion of Low Achievers in the Classroom

30 Pages Posted: 6 Mar 2012

See all articles by M. Daniele Paserman

M. Daniele Paserman

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Victor Lavy

University of Warwick - Department of Economics; Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Analia Schlosser

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Department of Economics

Date Written: March 2012

Abstract

We estimate the extent of ability peer effects and explore the mechanisms through which they operate. Using within‐school variation in the proportion of low‐ability students in Israeli schools, we find that the proportion of low‐ability peers has a negative effect on the performance of regular students. An exploration of the underlying mechanisms show that, relative to regular students, low‐ability students report higher levels of satisfaction with their teachers. However, a higher proportion of low‐ability students has detrimental effects on teachers’ pedagogical practices and on the quality of inter‐student and student–teacher relationships, and increases the level of violence and classroom disruptions.

Suggested Citation

Paserman, M. Daniele and Lavy, Victor and Schlosser, Analia, Inside the Black Box of Ability Peer Effects: Evidence from Variation in the Proportion of Low Achievers in the Classroom (March 2012). The Economic Journal, Vol. 122, Issue 559, pp. 208-237, 2012. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2016719 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2011.02463.x

M. Daniele Paserman

affiliation not provided to SSRN

No Address Available

Victor Lavy

University of Warwick - Department of Economics ( email )

Coventry CV4 7AL
United Kingdom

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Department of Economics ( email )

Mount Scopus
Jerusalem, 91905
Israel
+972 2 588 3245 (Phone)
+972 2 581 6071 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Analia Schlosser

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Department of Economics ( email )

Mount Scopus
Jerusalem, 91905
Israel
+972 2 588 3132 (Phone)
+972 2 581 6071 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://pluto.huji.ac.il/~ani

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