The (Non-)Effects of Campaign Finance Spending Bans on Macro Political Outcomes: Evidence from the States

37 Pages Posted: 7 Mar 2012

See all articles by Raymond J. La Raja

Raymond J. La Raja

University of Massachusetts at Amherst - Department of Political Science

Brian F. Schaffner

University of Massachusetts Amherst - Department of Political Science

Date Written: March 1, 2012

Abstract

This paper seeks to understand the effect of campaign finance laws on electoral and policy outcomes. Spurred by the recent Supreme Court decision, Citizens United v. FEC (2010), which eliminated bans on corporate and union political spending, the study focuses on whether such bans generate consequences notably different from an electoral system that lacks such bans. We observe three key outcomes: partisan control of government, incumbent reelection rates and corporate tax burdens. Using historical data on regulations in 49 American states between 1935 and 2009 we test alternative models for evaluating the impact of corporate and union spending bans put in place during this period. The results indicate that spending bans appear to have limited, if any, effect on these outcomes.

Keywords: campaign finance, Citizens United, elections, corruption, political contributions

Suggested Citation

La Raja, Raymond J. and Schaffner, Brian F., The (Non-)Effects of Campaign Finance Spending Bans on Macro Political Outcomes: Evidence from the States (March 1, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2017056 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2017056

Raymond J. La Raja (Contact Author)

University of Massachusetts at Amherst - Department of Political Science ( email )

200 Hicks Way, Thompson Hall
Amherst, MA 01003
United States
413.545-6182 (Phone)

Brian F. Schaffner

University of Massachusetts Amherst - Department of Political Science ( email )

Thompson Hall
Amherst, MA 01003
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
417
Abstract Views
1,907
rank
86,482
PlumX Metrics