Nash’s Bargaining Solution When the Disagreement Point is Random

Posted: 7 Mar 2012

See all articles by Rann Smorodinsky

Rann Smorodinsky

Technion-Israel Institute of Technology - The William Davidson Faculty of Industrial Engineering & Management

Date Written: March 7, 2012

Abstract

In his seminal work, Nash (1950) derives a solution for two-person bargaining problems, within a cooperative setup. Nash assumes that the result of disagreement is known to both players and is not stochastic. We study the same problem, where the last assumption is relaxed. We provide a set of axioms which characterizes a natural generalization.

Keywords: bargaining, Nash solution, random disagreement point

JEL Classification: C71, D74

Suggested Citation

Smorodinsky, Rann, Nash’s Bargaining Solution When the Disagreement Point is Random (March 7, 2012). Mathematical Social Sciences, Vol. 50, No. 1, 2005, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2017453

Rann Smorodinsky (Contact Author)

Technion-Israel Institute of Technology - The William Davidson Faculty of Industrial Engineering & Management ( email )

Haifa 32000
Israel

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