Nash’s Bargaining Solution When the Disagreement Point is Random
Posted: 7 Mar 2012
Date Written: March 7, 2012
Abstract
In his seminal work, Nash (1950) derives a solution for two-person bargaining problems, within a cooperative setup. Nash assumes that the result of disagreement is known to both players and is not stochastic. We study the same problem, where the last assumption is relaxed. We provide a set of axioms which characterizes a natural generalization.
Keywords: bargaining, Nash solution, random disagreement point
JEL Classification: C71, D74
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Smorodinsky, Rann, Nash’s Bargaining Solution When the Disagreement Point is Random (March 7, 2012). Mathematical Social Sciences, Vol. 50, No. 1, 2005, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2017453
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