Political Constitutionalism and the Value of Constitution Making

19 Pages Posted: 7 Mar 2012 Last revised: 9 Mar 2012

See all articles by Marco Goldoni

Marco Goldoni

University of Glasgow - Faculty of Law & Financial Studies

Date Written: March 7, 2012

Abstract

The debate on political constitutionalism has completely neglected the dimension of constitution making. This is probably due to the reason that constitution making usually brings with it undesirable outcomes like entrenchment of rights or structure. These outcomes do not respect reasonable disagreement among citizens because they violate the only fair system for settling this disagreement: majority rule and equal vote. This article aims to show that political constitutionalists may regret the complete absence of any claim about constitution making. Either they are overlooking certain problems inherent to the electoral process that is supposed to tackle with disagreement or, even worse, they are downplaying the entrenching effect of ordinary political processes by ignoring the redemptive properties of constituent power. In both cases, their claims are actually undermining the political dimension of constitutionalism.

Keywords: Political constitutionalism, Constitution Making, Constituent Power

Suggested Citation

Goldoni, Marco, Political Constitutionalism and the Value of Constitution Making (March 7, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2018023 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2018023

Marco Goldoni (Contact Author)

University of Glasgow - Faculty of Law & Financial Studies ( email )

Glasgow, Scotland
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www.gla.ac.uk/schools/law/staff/marcogoldoni/#tabs=0

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