Cartel Federalism? Antitrust Enforcement by State Attorneys General

25 Pages Posted: 11 Mar 2012 Last revised: 2 Nov 2012

See all articles by Michael Greve

Michael Greve

American Enterprise Institute (AEI); George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty

Date Written: 2005

Abstract

Largely in connection with the Microsoft litigation, the antitrust enforcement authority of state attorneys general, in their parens patriae capacity, has generated acrimonious debate. Perhaps the only point of genuine agreement is the complaint over the lack of reliable empirical evidence on state antitrust enforcement. This Essay attempts to make a modest contribution to the data front and a more ambitious and provocative contribution to the theoretical debate.

Keywords: Microsoft litigation, cartel federalism, state attorney general

Suggested Citation

Greve, Michael, Cartel Federalism? Antitrust Enforcement by State Attorneys General (2005). University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 72, p. 99, 2005, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2019188

Michael Greve (Contact Author)

American Enterprise Institute (AEI) ( email )

1150 17th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036
United States

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
108
Abstract Views
804
rank
305,730
PlumX Metrics