Lobbying: Buying and Utilizing Access

27 Pages Posted: 10 Mar 2012  

Wolfgang Mayer

University of Cincinnati - McMicken College of Arts and Sciences - Department of Economics

Sudesh Mujumdar

University of Southern Indiana

Date Written: 2012

Abstract

This paper introduces an alternative to the lobbying literature's standard assumption that money buys policies. Our model - in which influence-seeking requires both money to buy access and managerial time to utilize access - offers three significant benefits. First, it counters criticism that the money-buys-policies assumption is at odds with reality. Second, its much stronger lobbying incentives weaken the free-rider problem and raise incentives for lobby formation. Third, the model yields testable hypotheses on: the determinants of lobbying incentives; the number of lobbying firms in an industry; and the impact on industry lobbying by the size distribution of firms, contribution limits on firms, world price changes, and the ability to adjust labor employment.

Keywords: lobbying, free-rider problem, size-distribution-of-firms, world-price, labor-market-flexibility

JEL Classification: F16, H0, L1

Suggested Citation

Mayer, Wolfgang and Mujumdar, Sudesh, Lobbying: Buying and Utilizing Access (2012). Economics Discussion Paper No. 2012-15. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2019378 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2019378

Wolfgang Mayer (Contact Author)

University of Cincinnati - McMicken College of Arts and Sciences - Department of Economics ( email )

1202 Crosley
P.O. Box 210371
Cincinnati, OH 45221-0371
United States
513-556-2600 (Phone)
513-556-2669 (Fax)

Sudesh Mujumdar

University of Southern Indiana ( email )

8600 University Boulevard
Evansville, IN 47712
United States

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