Firm Growth and the Pricing of Discretionary Accruals

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Forthcoming

52 Pages Posted: 13 Mar 2012 Last revised: 18 Feb 2014

See all articles by Qiang Wu

Qiang Wu

Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI) - Lally School of Management

Ashok Robin

Rochester Institute of Technology (RIT) - E. Philip Saunders College of Business

Date Written: March 10, 2012

Abstract

This paper examines how firm growth conditions the pricing of discretionary accruals. Given the rich growth opportunities and high information asymmetry in high-growth firms, we expect that managers have incentives to use discretionary accruals, especially income increasing (positive) discretionary accruals, to signal favorable private information to external investors. Our empirical tests reveal that overall there is no significant difference in the pricing of discretionary accruals between high-growth and low-growth firms. However, consistent with our expectations, we find that in high-growth firms compared to low-growth firms, positive discretionary accruals are priced to a greater extent, while negative discretionary accruals are priced to a smaller extent. Additional tests show that positive discretionary accruals have a relatively greater association with future firm performance in high-growth firms. Finally, we find that the pricing of positive discretionary accruals in high-growth firms is predominantly in those firms with high levels of information asymmetry.

Keywords: Discretionary accruals, Firm growth, Information asymmetry, Signaling, Capital market, Valuation

JEL Classification: G14, M41

Suggested Citation

Wu, Qiang and Robin, Ashok, Firm Growth and the Pricing of Discretionary Accruals (March 10, 2012). Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2019623 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2019623

Qiang Wu (Contact Author)

Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI) - Lally School of Management ( email )

110 8th St
Troy, NY 12180
United States
518-276-3338 (Phone)
518-276-8661 (Fax)

Ashok Robin

Rochester Institute of Technology (RIT) - E. Philip Saunders College of Business ( email )

105 Lomb Memorial Dr.
Rochester, NY 14623
United States

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