Interlocking Directorates as a Trust Substitute: The Italian Non-Life Insurance Industry

1st International NPR Workshop: Networks, Power and Relations, September 16-17, 2009, Milan, Italy

26 Pages Posted: 26 Nov 2012

See all articles by Davide Carbonai

Davide Carbonai

Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS) - Departamento de Ciências Administrativas

Giovanni Di Bartolomeo

University of Teramo

Date Written: September 17, 2009

Abstract

This paper investigates the Italian insurance system by analyzing the (interlock) linkages among companies created through their directors. This approach defines interlocking directorates as the tie created between two companies when a person is a member of both boards of directors; each case of administrators’ co-presence is thus a connection between companies. The investigation follows a two-step procedure: first, it analyzes the social network of the insurance industry by focusing on the linkages among directors and among companies. Second, network statistics are combined in synthetic indices through principal component analyses in order to verify a correlation between indices and companies’ market shares. For the sake of brevity, this analysis is mainly restricted to non-life insurances, which are indeed the least competitive (as claimed 11 companies control the 78% of market) and most closed compared to the competition of other financial agents (life insurances compete with other forms of financial investments).

Suggested Citation

Carbonai, Davide and Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni, Interlocking Directorates as a Trust Substitute: The Italian Non-Life Insurance Industry (September 17, 2009). 1st International NPR Workshop: Networks, Power and Relations, September 16-17, 2009, Milan, Italy. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2020021 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2020021

Davide Carbonai (Contact Author)

Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS) - Departamento de Ciências Administrativas ( email )

Rua Washington Luiz, 855
Porto Alegre, 90010-460
Brazil
55 51 3308-3536 (Phone)
55 51 3308-3991 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.ufrgs.br/escoladeadministracao/

Giovanni Di Bartolomeo

University of Teramo ( email )

Campus Coste S. Agostino
Via R. Balzarini 1, Località Colleparco
Teramo, TE 64100
Italy

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