Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=2021136
 
 

Citations (4)



 


 



CEO Gender, Corporate Risk-Taking, and the Efficiency of Capital Allocation


Mara Faccio


University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; Purdue University - Krannert School of Management; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); National University of Singapore (NUS) - Asian Bureau of Finance and Economic Research (ABFER)

Maria-Teresa Marchica


University of Manchester - Manchester Business School

Roberto Mura


University of Manchester - Manchester Business School

February 12, 2016


Abstract:     
We extend the literature on how managerial traits relate to corporate choices by documenting that firms run by female CEOs have lower leverage, less volatile earnings, and a higher chance of survival than otherwise similar firms run by male CEOs. Additionally, transitions from male to female CEOs (or vice-versa) are associated with economically and statistically significant reductions (increases) in corporate risk-taking. The results are robust to controlling for the endogenous matching between firms and CEOs using a variety of econometric techniques. We further document that this risk-avoidance behavior appears to lead to distortions in the capital allocation process. These results potentially have important macroeconomic implications for long-term economic growth.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 51

Keywords: CEO, gender, risk-taking

JEL Classification: G31, G32, J16


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Date posted: March 14, 2012 ; Last revised: February 16, 2016

Suggested Citation

Faccio, Mara and Marchica, Maria-Teresa and Mura, Roberto, CEO Gender, Corporate Risk-Taking, and the Efficiency of Capital Allocation (February 12, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2021136 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2021136

Contact Information

Mara Faccio (Contact Author)
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )
5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
Purdue University - Krannert School of Management ( email )
1310 Krannert Building
West Lafayette, IN 47907-1310
United States
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
National University of Singapore (NUS) - Asian Bureau of Finance and Economic Research (ABFER) ( email )
BIZ 2 Storey 4, 04-05
1 Business Link
Singapore, 117592
Singapore
Maria-Teresa Marchica
University of Manchester - Manchester Business School ( email )
Crawford House
Oxford Road
Manchester M13 9PL
United Kingdom
+44(0)1612750121 (Phone)
+44(0)1612754023 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.personal.mbs.ac.uk/mmarchica/index.htm
Roberto Mura
University of Manchester - Manchester Business School ( email )
Crawford House
Oxford Road
Manchester, Lancashire M13 9PL
United Kingdom
+44 (0) 161 275 4023 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.robertomura.com
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