Reducing Opacity in Over-the-Counter Markets

63 Pages Posted: 14 Mar 2012 Last revised: 10 Sep 2018

See all articles by Zhuo Zhong

Zhuo Zhong

University of Melbourne - Department of Finance

Date Written: June 26, 2015

Abstract

In this paper, I evaluate how a centralized market impacts the opacity of an over-the-counter (OTC) market. I show that a competitive centralized market provides an incentive for dealers in the OTC market to reduce opacity, whereas a noncompetitive centralized market does not. Competition between the competitive centralized market and the OTC market forces dealers in the latter to reduce opacity. With the noncompetitive centralized market, opportunities for collusion provide an incentive for dealers to increase opacity. Specifically, the natural monopoly market maker in the noncompetitive centralized market coordinates his spread according to dealers’ spreads to profit from opacity.

Keywords: Market Microstructure, Over-the-Counter, Transparency

JEL Classification: G14, G18, D83, D81

Suggested Citation

Zhong, Zhuo, Reducing Opacity in Over-the-Counter Markets (June 26, 2015). Journal of Financial Markets, Vol. 27, 2016, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2021226 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2021226

Zhuo Zhong (Contact Author)

University of Melbourne - Department of Finance ( email )

Faculty of Economics and Commerce
Parkville, Victoria 3010 3010
Australia

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